In this posting I want to be as selfish as to deal with a topic that has engaged me for some time, i.e. the issue of 'zeal' (zelos), in the works of Philo and how he possibly considered it an impetus for measurements against transgressors of the Torah.
Concerning my former works, see my book on Establishment Violence listed in the left frame of this blog; in addition, consider also 'Saul of Tarsus and Early Zealotism. Reading Gal 1.13-14 in Light of Philo's Writings,' Biblica 83 (2002):449-471; and (Re)Presentations of Violence in Philo of Alexandria. Paper read at the SBL Annual Meeting 2003. (Atlanta, Georgia). In my firstmentioned work, my dissertation, I argued that the primary texts investigated (Spec.leg. 1,54-57; 1,314-318 and 2,252-254) suggested that Philo did not here deal with theoretical laws, but with actual issues of the Law to be observed. However, I did not support the theory of E. R. Goodenough that his discussions were derived from his practice in Jewish courts in Alexandria. But Philo's pinpointing of "thousands of zealots for the Law", ready to take actions against culprits, were to be taken as indications of social issues, that is, as a scenario he considered to be part of the social situation in Alexandria at his time. Such actions, in light of the dominating jurisdiction in Alexandria, should be characterized as 'establishment violence' and 'vigilantism', that is, "acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order, which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some sort of subversion". My main conclusion to the question if Philo really supported establishment violence was phrased thus: "we have no sources available that provide evidence that Philo supported actual cases of establishment violence. But what we have are his expositions of cases of gross non-conformity to the Torah where he both draws upon traditions of the great OT hero Phinehas, and where he depicts the agents to carry out counter-measures as inflicting these quite independently of any decision of court. Hence his expositions dealt with . . . might very well be taken both then and now as evidence for an endorsing attitude to establishment violence" (p. 181).
My views have been variously received, but terms as 'establishment violence' end 'vigilantism' are now finding their way into studies of both Philo and of, e.g., the actions taken against Stephen in the Lucan Acts of the Apostles, a text also dealt with in my study.
Now, these issues have come up for discussions in two recent studies, one supporting my view, the other not.
The first one to be mentioned here, argues against my view: C. Batsch,
La Guerre et les rites de guerre dans le judaïsme du deuxième Temple (
Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 93; Leiden Boston: Brill, 2005). His main arguments against my view, as far as I understand him, are that Philo's passages, in which he discusses these issues, are allegorical interpretations of the Phinehas episode. While there admittedly are several allegorical expositions of Phinehas in Philo's works, this can, in my view, hardly be said of the passages drawn upon from Specialibus Legibus (1,54-57; 1,314-318 and 2,252-254). Batsch is here not distinguishing between Philo's various expositions: when he says that "le terme est utilisé par Philon seulement dans des représentations allégoriques" (p. 158), he is certainly wrong. He is also arguing that the term 'zelos' is not used in the expositions of Phinehas; but this is also hardly defendable in light of Spec.leg 1,54-57. Thirdly, he argues that Philo does not support the vigilantes mentioned in the texts. When he presents the ideology of the zealots, Philo says that they 'nomisantas autous' etc. According to Batch, this description signals that Philo is distancing himself from them. But then Batsch fails to consider that Philo just before this expression in fact says that "
it is well that all who have a zeal for virtue should be permitted to exact the penalties offhand and with no delay" (1,55).
The other recent study published is quite favorably to my view of Philo here: see K. Berthelot, “Zeal for God and Divine Law in Philo and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism 19 (2007) 113–29.
She strongly argues, that Philo is here presenting Phinehas as an example --indeed ,
the example of those who are zealous. Her conclusions are thus very similar to my own: " On a theoretical level, it is thus beyond doubt that Philo advocated the killing on the spot of Jews who publicly apostatized, committed idolatry or uttered blasphemy. His works probably testify to such a practice in his days, although not necessarily in Alexandria itself" (127). Furthermore, due to Philo's rhetoric, is is difficult to say "with any degree of certainty", "that, in a concrete situation, Philo would have gone so far as to advocate the killing of a Jew caught worshipping a foreign god or blaspheming. This issue must be left open, but one should not ignore the weight of the evidence contained in Philo's works themselves."
With this weighted conclusion, I would concur. We cannot predict how Philo himself would have reacted, but I still do think that Philo's own expositions indicate a living trajectory of interpretation of the influence of the Phinehas episode even in his time and his world.
